The Javanese Tsunami Sweeping the Tombs of Habibs: Widespread Tomb Demolitions in Java and the Backlash Against Arabised Islam

In 2019, annadpk wrote one of the most iconic posts of r/indonesia, explaining why Prabowo-Sandi lost in the 2019 elections. In short, he argued that the Javanese people rallied behind Jokowi due to the perceived threat to their identity and culture, as manifested by the FPI and "habib-habib Arab". This was accompanied by a revival in Javanese culture and the shift to traditionalism. However, this post did not explain why the Javanese and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) felt threatened by the likes of the FPI.

Today, this “Javanese tsunami” still has not abated. Instead, the Javanese tsunami has swept the tombs of Arabic habibs. In recent months, there is a widespread phenomenon in the Javanese heartland that has escaped wider national attention, since we tend to focus on what’s happening in Jakarta. That phenomenon is the demolition and destruction of the tombs of “Arabic” habibs. Here are some examples:

Probolinggo Makam Habib Palsu di Probolinggo Dibongkar (from 16 August 2023: demolition of the tomb of Habib Sholeh bin Abdullah in Gerongan, Probolinggo, East Java).

Makam Habib Palsu Dibongkar Warga, Bangunan Megah Kini Hancur, Sang Pemilik Pasrah Tak Melawan (from 20 September 2024: destruction of the tomb of Habib Amir bin Yahya in Rowosari, Pemalang, Central Java. The locals came and destroyed the tomb with a hammer).

Dibongkar! Makam Habib Usman bin Yahya di Tambakromo Pati Diubah Jadi Petilasan (from 18 October 2024: demolition of the tomb of Habib Usman bin Yahya in Tambakromo, Pati, Central Java. Inhabitants of the village and members of the Pejuang Walisongo Indonesia or the Indonesian Walisongo Fighters agreed to dismantle the tomb of the "fake habib" Usman bin Yahya)

You can also find plenty of videos on YouTube:

Dituding Palsu, Makam Bertuliskan Habib di Madiun Dirusak Massa (members of Indonesian Walisongo Fighters destroyed the tombs of habibs in Bodag, Madiun, East Java. Kiai Abdul Sirod from the organisation said they intended to “correct history” or “meluruskan sejarah”)

In Wonosobo, they even went as far as dismantling 78 tombs of “ulemas and habibs”.

This one is a TikTok from the foothills of Mount Penanggungan, East Java, where the tomb of a “fake” habib who “died in 1586” was desecrated while the tomb of “Mbah Kretojoyo” who died in 1574 was left intact.

This phenomenon is so widespread in the Javanese heartland that TV One even made a segment about it, although they did not really manage to understand the bigger picture. Apparently, the phenomenon is not limited to the Javanese heartland. According to a news report from 2021, 12 fake tombs were dismantled in Lebak, Banten; it was alleged that these fake tombs were secretly built during the COVID-19 pandemic. Dozens of “fake” gravestones of “habibs” in Tabalong, South Kalimantan were destroyed in 2020.

Basically, the tombs of Arabic habibs all over the Javanese heartland are being opened and dismantled. They found that the tombs are totally empty. Thus, they concluded that the tombs are “fake” and that history has been “manipulated” by the Ba’Alawi habibs.

Alongside this trend, you can also find plenty of videos with hundreds of thousands of views “exposing” the “fake lineage of the habibs”. In the comment Section, you can see that Javanese people are cheering that “the manipulation of history by the Ba’Alawi is finally over”.

Outside observers may think that this demolition is similar to what Saudi Arabia did in Mecca, but this is not a reform movement in the name of “purifying Islam”. Instead, the demolition is spearheaded by traditionalist Muslims, often with the blessing of the local population. A leading figure in “exposing” (membongkar) the “lies” of the Arabic habibs is Kiai Imaduddin (Kiai Imad) from the Nahdlatul Ulama, who published a book on this issue.

In this post, I would like to explain the background of this phenomenon and why it involved a bigger conflict between traditionalist Muslims and Arabic habibs; why the Javanese and the NU find Arabic habibs repulsive; and why this phenomenon is among the most significant events in the Reformasi era. It may change the course of our political and religious history, as well as the identity of the Indonesian nation as a whole.

Ba’Alawi and Arabic Habibs

Many people here, especially those who live in Jakarta and are not exposed to the daily lives in the Javanese heartland, may wonder: what’s the deal with the destruction of habib tombs? First, we need to understand the background of the “Ba’Alawi”.

Sadat Ba'Alawi basically refers to Arabs who originally came from Hadhramaut, Yemen to Indonesia. They are believed to be families of Sayyid (descendant of Prophet Muhammad). To be more objective, let me copy an explanation from an article that is written by a member of the Ba’Alawi family himself:

“Since they settled in Indonesia over two centuries ago, the Ba‘Alawi have been well-respected for their commercial activities, philanthropy, and religious knowledge. They are the descendants of ‘Alwi bin ‘Ubaidillah from Hadhramaut, Yemen. In Ba‘Alawi literature, he is listed as a grandson of Ahmad bin ‘Isa [also known as Ahmad Muhajir]. This connection with Ahmad is important as he is in turn listed as a descendant of the Prophet via his grandson, Hussein bin Ali. However, [Kiyai] Imaduddin [from the Nahdlatul Ulama] challenged this connection, arguing that Ahmad bin ‘Isa neither had a son named ‘Ubaidillah nor a grandson named ‘Alwi. This claim was made based on his examination of authoritative books of record of the Prophet’s descendants (kitab nasab) from the period of Ahmad bin ‘Isa’s lifetime in the fourth century of Islam and the subsequent five centuries after that. These books do not list ‘Alwi’s and ‘Ubaidillah’s names.

(...)

The Ba‘Alawi are commonly referred to as habib (plural habaib), an Arabic word which means “beloved one” and is used as an honorific for male religious scholars of Ba‘Alawi lineage. Well-known figures in Indonesia include Habib Ali Al-Habsyi (1839–1913), the author of Simth Ad-Dhurar, a book of life stories and praises for Prophet Muhammad recited during the celebration of his birthday, and Habib Luthfi bin Yahya (born 1947), the current leader of the community of Sufi orders (JATMAN) and a member of the Presidential Advisory Council.

Despite the general reverence for the habaib, Imaduddin’s sympathisers agree with his challenge on the grounds of their disapproval of the behaviour of certain habib. For example, there is Habib Rizieq bin Shihab (born 1965) of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) who used to conduct raids on “dens of vice”, like discotheques, massage parlours, and karaoke studios. He also led a series of mass demonstrations against the then-Jakarta Governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) that polarised Indonesian society. There is also the younger Habib Bahar bin Sumaith (born 1985), a preacher who likes to curse and often uses aggressive words in his religious sermons. As a result of such behaviour, Imaduddin’s sympathisers question why these supposed descendants of the Prophet (in their view) “speak harshly”, “ruin religion”, and “mobilise anti-government sentiments among the Muslim masses”.

Basically, the leaders of notorious “Islamist” groups such as the FPI, like Habib Rizieq and Habib Bahar, all claim their legitimacy as a Sayyid (descendant of the prophet). They earned the reverence of the local population by claiming to be a “habib”; in Indonesia, this title is only used by those claiming to be the descendant of the prophet. Why does this matter? Since the Dutch colonial area, people have long come to these habibs as well as the tombs of renowned habibs to obtain blessings. The tombs are part of their claim to legitimacy as a Sayyid. The famous "Makam Mbah Priok" in Tanjung Priok, for example, is the tomb of "Habib Hasan Muhammad Al Hadad". The Betawi people really believe that this tomb is “sakti” (endowed with sacral power), and many of them still come to this tomb to obtain blessings.

How strong is the Sayyid persona for many regular Muslims? An ethnographic work in Tanah Abang reported that even after the dissolution of the FPI and Habib Rizieq being thrown to jail for violating COVID-19 regulations, he was still widely respected as a Sayyid, with prayer stickers even bearing his image. The author also observed, “Indeed, in many pious Betawi communities, habib, who are believed to be the descendants of the Prophet, are not only held in high social and cultural esteem, but it is believed they can perform miracles. In July 2020, viral footage of 'the invulnerability' of Rizieq's banner when burned by some anti-FPI protesters in front of parliamentary building, is presented by his followers as evidence that he is an Islamic saint who can perform miracles.“ That’s why the tombs really matter: being a habib will elevate you to a saintly status, which implies getting “contributions” from your loyal devotees.

Why the Javanese and the Traditional Muslims Hate the Habibs

Both the habibs and kyai-kyai NU are Muslims, so why do the Javanese and the traditional Muslims hate the Ba’Alawi to the gut?

The hostility of the Javanese towards the Arabs has a long history. The Suluk Gatholoco (1872) involved a walking and talking p*nis who criticised the Javanese for abandoning the Hindu-Buddha religion and embracing the religion of the "Arabs", at the time when the Javanese felt threatened by the colonialist Dutch and Arabised Islam. Serat Darmagandhul (1873) told that “The rats are the Muslims of Arab descent who came to Java as beggars, requested the king's hospitality and, little by little, appropriated everything. The bees likewise are an allusion to the Muslims, because they sting treacherously.”

Today, on the surface, the NU will claim that they oppose the FPI and habibs to defend the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). They would say it’s all for the sake of pluralism and diversity. But as is typical of Javanese people, you cannot just take their words literally. I think it comes to two major factors: cultural incompatibility and the feeling of the Javanese identity being under siege.

Regarding cultural incompatibility, the Javanese are known to be alus people, both in the inner realm (batin) and the outer realm (lahir). Here is an explanation from the eminent anthropologist Clifford Geertz:

“It is in connection with this "proper ordering" that the contrast between alus, the word meaning "pure," "refined," "polished," "exquisite," "ethereal," "subtle," "civilized," "smooth," and kasar, the word meaning "impolite," "rough," "uncivilized," "coarse," "insensitive," "vulgar," comes into play. The goal is to be alus in both separated realms of the self. In the inner realm [batin] this is to be achieved through religious discipline, much but not all of it mystical. In the outer realm [lahir], it is to be achieved through etiquette, the rules of which, in this instance, are not only extraordinarily elaborate but have something of the force of law. Through meditation the civilized man thins out his emotional life to a kind of constant hum; through etiquette, he both shields that life from external disruptions and regularizes his outer behavior in such a way that it appears to others as a predictable, undisturbing, elegant, and rather vacant set of choreographed motions and settled forms of speech”.

You can easily see the contrast between the NU kiyais and Arabic habibs. Here is a video of an NU kiyai preaching in Javanese with more than a million views; notice that one of the comments said “Menyejukkan Kiyai2 pribumi dalam ceramahnya”, (“how soothing are native Indonesian ulemas in delivering the sermon”), the mention of “pribumi” is not random there. Even this “angry” speech against the Ba’Alawi still sounds “alus”. By contrast, listen to Habib Rizieq’s response to the NU’s “sweeping” against the Ba’Alawi. He has long been known for his crass language, like saying “Pancagila” and “Pancasila Sukarno ketuhanan ada di pantat”; here is a video of him calling for the killing of Ahok. Habib Rizieq’s crassness is still nothing compared to the infamous Habib Bahar bin Smith. Here is a video of him brandishing a sword, "usually we cut chickens, this time we cut people up". When the Javanese and NU people think of “habibs”, these are the first people who will appear in their minds.

Initially, the NU people did not really mind the habibs as long as they remain outside the Javanese heartland. However, as discussed by annadpk in his original post, the fear that the Javanese identity is being threatened by the FPI and Arabic habibs has surged since the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, after the huge 212 movement that was spearheaded by the likes of Habib Rizieq and Habib Bahar. Here is his thoughtful observation:

“since the 2017 Jakarta election, FPI has penetrated deeper into East and Central Java, as well emerged from a street vigilante group to a center of Islamic and national politics challenge NU. PDI-P and NU have been aligned in past elections like Megawati - Hasyim Muzadi in 2004, and they still lost heavily to SBY in East Java, because there was no common threat to unite most of the NU branches in East and Central Java. But [when] FPI presence became more visible in small town Java, ordinary Javanese started to worry which motivated many NU leaders to take action.”

The rejection of the FPI and Arabic habibs’ presence in Java did occur before and after the 2017 election. The NU’s Banser has been leading the effort to stop the FPI from making inroad in Kendal (2013), Demak (2016), Salatiga (2017), Semarang (2017), and Gresik (2017). I think it is the scale of the movement in Jakarta that alarmed the Javanese and the NU; both the Javanese and non-Muslims were highly concerned that the likes of FPI would take over the country.

But the biggest beef between traditionalist Muslims and the Arabic habibs is the perception that the Wali Songo is being ‘Ba’Alawinized’. For those who are unaware of the importance of the Wali Songo to traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia, here is a brief snapshot:

“The canonical list of the Wali Songo includes: Sunan Ampel, Sunan Malik Ibrahim, Sunan Giri, Sunan Bonang, Sunan Drajat, Sunan Muria, Sunan Kudus, Sunan Kalijaga, and Sunan Gunung Jati. This list only became canonical over a period of centuries and through the development of local ziyara [pilgrimage] traditions. There are many awliya in Java who were contemporaries to the Wali Songo and were equally as important for the spread of Islam in Java but were not encoded into the canon (...).

Many stories and legends emerged about the Wali Songo in the following centuries. They came to serve as a collective symbol of the natural and native flourishing of an indigenous Islamic tradition in Java. For many Javanese, they are symbolic spiritual ancestors—models of enduring faith and steadfast devotion which can serve as inspiration for the contemporary believer (...).”

The legend behind these sunans is also interesting and often sounds more like a Hindu-Buddhist tale. For instance, Sunan Kalijaga was a Javanese robber named Raden Djaka Sahid who tried to mug Sunan Bonang. The Sunan had a magical power and turned a banyan tree into gold, showing that worldly possessions mean nothing. Impressed, Raden Djaka Sahid asked to be the sunan’s disciple. The sunan told him to meditate by the river until he returned. Years (or even decades, depending on the version) later, he was still there, covered in moss and roots. The Sunan then asked him questions about religion and Raden Djaka Sahid managed to answer all of them. Thus, he converted to Islam without ever reading the Quran or the Hadith nor uttering the Shahada. Instead, it was through decades of meditation by the river (ergo “watching the river”, kali jogo) that led to an inner change of heart (batin). When reading about this story, it reminds me more of the encounter of Angulimala with Gautama Buddha, instead of the tale of a Semitic prophet.

But the Arabic habibs are claiming that the Wali Songo were all Ba’Alawi Sayyids. Here is a video of Habib Rizieq making this claim. An article from the Republika, which is a modernist Muslim publication, discussed the "theory" that the Wali Songo were all descendants of Ahmad Muhajir. Bang Haji Rhoma Irama openly criticised the Ba’Alawi for claiming the Wali Songo as theirs.

NU members are furious with this claim because they feel that their (Javanese) identity is being threatened and trampled by the Arabic habibs. The Dean of the Faculty of the Islamic Religion of the University of Nahdlatul Ulama (UNU) Blitar was concerned that there had been attempts to claim the tombs of Mataram princesses as tombs of “habibs from Yemen”.

Given the fear induced by the likes of the FPI in 2016-2017, this is like adding fuel to the fire. It is not a coincidence that the NU group that is often involved in the demolition is called the “Pejuang Walisongo Indonesia” (Indonesian Walisongo Fighters), which has a strong presence and many branches in the Javanese heartland. In a long speech by Gus Abbas of the NU, he observed that a "Wahhabic" movement is seeking to "poison" Indonesian Islam that is directly inherited from the Wali Songo and "our ancestors". "They hated the ulemas of the NU, and even our symbol, our Pancasila was insulted and considered an idol." "They even said our state is an infidel state". "There was a habib who said the Presidential Palace is a dajjal state, the president is a devil president, and even Gus Yaqut as a Minister of Religion was claimed to be the devil”. He alleged that the fake tombs were built by these habibs "to make as if the Ba'Alawi owned Indonesia".

Basically, the relationship between traditionalist Muslims in Java and the Arabic habibs now is really tense. To every action there is always an equal reaction: an NU convoy in Rengasdengklok, Karawang, West Java was attacked by people looking for Kiai Imad, the leading figure of the campaign against the Ba’Alawi. His presence in Madura was also opposed by ulemas on the ground that he disrespected the “habibs” and their descendants. But in the Javanese heartland, there is a broad consensus that it is time to “take action” against the Ba’Alawi.

Continued Javanese Tsunami against the Arabic Habibs

After Jokowi won the election in 2019 by riding on the "Javanese tsunami", he accomplished a task that no other president or general has managed to do for years: dissolving the FPI, an organisation led by Habib Rizieq Shihab, who himself is a Ba'Alawi. As explained by annadpk's excellent post:

“The first reason why the Javanese shifted heavily to Jokowi in 2019 was important pillars of Javanese society felt threatened by a common threat (PKS, Gerindra and FPI). The mood in the Javanese homeland was of righteous indignation (atau kemarahan benar in Indonesian), which Jokowi and others on his side were able to channel (...).

Most Javanese are OK with FPI, as long as they stay away from Central Java and East Java, and don't take control of Islam nationally. The animosity toward FPI is attributed in part, because most of its top leadership are Arab Indonesians. No senior national figure talked openly about their ethnicity, until Hendropriyono open his big mouth. The thought of Rizieq Shibab, an Arab-Betawi half-breed, even getting near the Ministry of Religion, would cause many Javanese to throw up.”

The mass attacks and demolitions against the tombs of the habibs are a continuation of the Javanese backlash against the Arabic habibs, which were channelled by Jokowi during the 2019 elections and which gave him the legitimacy to dissolve the FPI. It was part of a massive campaign to delegitimise the habibs, to show that they are “fakes” and that is reflected by their crassness and rudeness. NU members have even alleged that the Ba’Alawi were the underlings of the Dutch colonialists, since Habib Usman bin Yahya, the Grand Mufti of Batavia, was cooperating with the Dutch and publicly prayed for Queen Wilhelmina. They may not say it directly, but the undertone is clear: they are alleging that the Arabs are trying to colonise Indonesians and “manipulate” history by building fake tombs to legitimise their power over Islamic matters and the Islamic community.

It is even possible that the Ba’Alawi controversy affected the results of the 2024 presidential election. As we all know, Prabowo-Gibran won a landslide in Java. What is notable is that while Anies finished second at the national level, he was utterly obliterated in the Javanese heartland. In some regencies in Central Java, he only got 6-9%. The same phenomenon can be seen in Javanese-majority areas of East Java. Further, Ganjar won more votes than Anies in all regencies in Yogyakarta. Anies’ identity as an ethnic Arab and the FPI’s support for his candidacy in 2017 did not help his case; here is a video alleging Anies being supported by the Ba’Alawi.

Conclusion

The Javanese are currently undergoing a cultural Renaissance, as demonstrated by blooming cultural events, renewed interest in history and traditional architecture, as well as viral Javanese content on YouTube. This was accompanied with a backlash against the FPI, Arabic Habibs, as well as “Arabised Islam” or “Wahhabism”. With the debate over “habibs”, the lineage of Ba’Alawi and Wali Songo still ongoing, the demolition of tombs, and the discovery that these tombs were empty in the first place, would have significant effect on how Indonesians practice Islam. It would delegitimise the claims of many habibs, which may have repercussions beyond the Javanese heartland.

The backlash against “Arabised Islam” may be among the most significant events in the Reformasi era. In 2016-17, both the Javanese and non-Muslims were highly concerned about the potential takeover of the country by the “desert lizards” (kadrun). Today, the rallying cry of the traditionalist Muslims is the “Ba’Alawi”. Both traditionalist Muslims and non-Muslims are horrified by people like Habib Rizieq, and the consensus between the two on the need to defend the Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika would serve to keep more radical forms of Islam in check.

It is also worth noting that the PKS is performing poorly in the 2024 local elections, with the notable exception of West Sumatra where their incumbent governor won a landslide. Moreover, Dedi Mulyadi, the former Regent of Purwakarta who was famous for his efforts to revive Sundanese culture, won a landslide in West Java. The FPI and Habib Rizieq were very vocal in opposing Dedi Mulyadi and accused him of idolatry. Dedi Mulyadi has also made speeches that did not mention them by name, but it was clear he was referring to the Ba’Alawi. Dedi’s victory is basically like a giant middle finger to the likes of Habib Rizieq. In the next five years, the backlash against the Arabic habibs would continue to intensify and may even spread to places like West Java.